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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TYLER CLIFF KNARR,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44714
Ada County Case No.
CR-2016-3079

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Knarr failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified sentence of 20 years, with 12 years fixed, upon his guilty plea to
trafficking in heroin, with a second trafficking offense enhancement?

Knarr Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
On February 2, 2016, an undercover detective made arrangements to meet with
Audri Foster and Caven King, from whom he had previously purchased heroin during
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controlled buys, to purchase nine grams of heroin for $1,800.00. (PSI, p.82. 1) Foster
told the detective that they “would need about an hour to go pick it up.” (PSI, p.82.)
The surveillance team subsequently observed King drive to Knarr’s residence to pick up
the heroin, then return to Foster’s residence, where King and Foster weighed and
packaged nine grams of heroin and sold it to the undercover detective for the agreedupon amount. (PSI, pp.83-84, 112.)
DEA agents later accompanied Knarr’s parole officer to Knarr’s residence and,
upon searching the residence, they located approximately five grams of heroin, a digital
scale with brown residue, spoons, several syringes, a “small amount” of marijuana, and
$4,360.00 in cash. (PSI, pp.113-16.) DEA agents also found “numerous text-message
conversations about buying and selling heroin in [Knarr’s] phone,” and an officer’s drug
detecting K-9 alerted to the $4,360.00 of cash “after [the cash] had been placed in a
clean area of the house.” (PSI, pp.114-15.) Knarr admitted that “he had been selling
and using heroin for some time,” that he had recently sold heroin to several individuals,
and that he was “a heroin source of supply to Caven King, Audri Foster, and others.”
(PSI, pp.111-13.)
The state charged Knarr with conspiracy to traffic in heroin (in excess of 28
grams), trafficking in heroin (two or more grams, but less than seven grams), and
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.92-94.) The state also filed an Information
Part II, charging Knarr with having committed a second trafficking offense. (R., pp.104-
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Knarr
44714 psi.pdf.”
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05.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Knarr pled guilty to trafficking in heroin (two or more
grams, but less than seven grams), with a second trafficking offense enhancement, and
the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., p.103.) The district court imposed a
unified sentence of 20 years, with 12 years fixed. (R., pp.116-19.) Knarr filed a notice
of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.127-30.)
Knarr asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his substance abuse, claim
that he is “committed to make the necessary changes,” and purported remorse and
acceptance of responsibility.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)

The record supports the

sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire
length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d
217, 226 (2008).

It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the

defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. McIntosh, 160 Idaho
at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant must show
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution. Id. The district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give
them differing weights when deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629;
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its
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discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment, deterrence and protection of
society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In deference to the trial judge, this
Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds
might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at
148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).

Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits

prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The penalty for trafficking in heroin (two or more grams, but less than seven
grams), with a second trafficking offense enhancement, is a mandatory minimum of six
years, up to life in prison. I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(6), -2732B(a)(7). The district court
imposed a unified sentence of 20 years, with 12 years fixed, which falls well within the
statutory guidelines. (R., pp.116-19.)
On appeal, Knarr contends that he “has taken responsibility for his actions” in the
instant offense. (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) However, although Knarr initially admitted to
DEA agents that he had been selling heroin “for some time” and that he was “a heroin
source of supply to Caven King, Audri Foster, and others,” he later (during his
presentence interview) denied selling heroin to King or Foster; a denial that he appears
to have maintained throughout the sentencing hearing. (PSI, pp.5, 22, 111-13; Tr.,
p.32, L.21 – p.36, L.9.)

As such, it is clear that Knarr was not accepting full

responsibility – either during his presentence interview or at the time of sentencing – for
his actions in the instant offense.
With respect to Knarr’s substance abuse, purported remorse, and claim that he is
committed to making changes, Knarr has previously made the same assertions many
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times, and yet has failed to make any rehabilitative progress and has repeatedly
resumed the same criminal behavior. (PSI, pp.10-11, 17, 71-74, 157, 162-63, 172-73,
221-23, 234, 240, 252, 257-58, 263-64, 267, 280.) He has been committing drug- and
alcohol-related offenses since 2001, was adjudicated for or convicted of at least 14 such
offenses between the ages of 14 and 29, and also admitted that he produced alcohol
and “intravenously injected meth and heroin for a year” during a prior six-year prison
term.

(PSI, pp.6-11, 162, 164.)

Knarr has previously participated in a plethora of

treatment programs, including the Lifeline Therapeutic Community Program (while in
prison), TC Aftercare, a rider at NICI (where he completed the “A New Direction”
substance abuse program), Community Services Counseling, AA/NA, the Ada County
Drug Court program, the Juvenile Drug Court program, substance abuse treatment
while on juvenile probation, the Idaho Youth Ranch and Aftercare program, the
SAS/EDI Residential program, “other outpatient and aftercare programs,” and a detox
program at Allumbaugh House; however, he was frequently terminated from and/or
failed to follow through with treatment. (PSI, pp.11, 17, 71-74, 161, 222-23, 228, 231,
237-39, 259, 277.) As stated by the presentence investigator, Knarr’s known criminal
history dates back 16 years and “is fraught with drug related offenses that no amount of
prison-based treatment or community-based treatment seem to have any impact in
mitigating his drug abuse and criminal conduct.” (PSI, p.22.)
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable
to its decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Knarr’s sentence. (Tr., p.38,
L.15 – p.40, L.12.) The state submits that Knarr has failed to establish an abuse of
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discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing
hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Knarr’s conviction and
sentence.

DATED this 18th day of May, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of May, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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through the pathway they choose for him In six
years.
So, again, Judge, I'd ask the Court to
consider some of those options. He Is a
relatively young guy. Like I said, he's got some
support. He's got some pretty good job skills.
And I've seen his tax returns because there's a
civil issue pending and in 2015 he made $38,000 as
a welder. So he's got some skills. He Just needs
to obviously be careful about who he's hanging out
with, get his addictions under control and
certainly quit hurting himself and his family and
society by dealing drugs and hopefully he can turn
this around.
So, again, I would ask the court to
consider some of those options. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Knarr, Is there anything you want
to tell me before I decide what sentence to
impose?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I'd just like to
say I'm not trying to dodge responslbillty or
anything, but I am sorry about all of this. I
mean, It pains me to see these young people go to
prison, too. I wish I really had never got
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involved in heroin. It really grabbed me.
That's all, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: Is there any legal cause why
Judgment can't be entered?
MS. R EILLY: Unknown to the State, Your
Honor.
MR. LEWIS: No, Judge. I apologize for
prolonging this. There is one thing I forgot to
mention. The records that I gave you are fairly
Important for another reason. One of the deals
was conducted on February 2nd of 2016. My client
was In rehab during that particular buy and that's
another nine grams and another $1,800. So that
was part of what I'd denote to Your Honor as well.
THE COURT: Based on your pleas of guilty,
Mr. Knarr, I'll find you guilty both of the
trafficking in heroin charge and the persistent
violator.
As I've been trying to sort what the
appropriate sentence is in your case and
considering those Toohill factors; protecting
society, rehabilitation, deterrence and
punishment, I'm reminded that part of the
calculation In sentencing Is the crime and a part
of the calculation is the defendant. You present
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a significantly different picture personally than
Ms. Perkins did with respect to history. Your
crimes, it seems to me, are simply serious and I'm
left with the Impression after reviewing the
presentence investigation and the police reports,
that to some extent you got lucky that you didn't
have the requisite amount of heroin on your person
at the time that the search was conducted because
it appears to me that it is more likely than not
that you were the source certainly for Mr. King
and likely for Ms. Perkins.
I have a difficult time justifying a
sentence that would depreciate the seriousness of
that offense particularly in light of your
criminal history. Another trafficking Just a
couple of years ago and manufacturing in 2014.
And you don't limit your criminal conduct to
substance abuse. You have theft offenses,
burglary, DU ls. And all of those things are
accumulated in the context of the State providing
every service that it can think of to try and
support you making different choices. It appears
to me that It no longer matters what services we
provide, you are still likely, extremely likely,
to reoffend and when you reoffend you're going to
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engage in conduct that puts the rest of the
community at risk.
My sense is there needs to be a
component that address clearly the protection of
society, but also specific deterrence to keep you
from doing that sort of thing.
To that end I'm going to impose an
aggregate term of 20 years in custody in the
Department of Correction with a fixed minimum term
of 12 years followed by an indeterminate term of
eight years. In addition to that I'll Impose a
$10,000 fine.
That would be the judgment of the
Court. Do you have any questions about the
judgment?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Knarr, you have the right to
appeal this judgment. You have 42 days in which
to take that appeal from the date j udgment is
flied and entered. You have the right to be
represented by an appeal in pursuing the appeal.
If cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for you at public expense. Also, the
payment of costs will be at public expense.
MS. REILLY: And, Judge, the State is

Kim Madsen, Official Court Reporter, Boise, Idaho
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